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Strategic Insight 
With New Nuclear Arms Pact, Attention Shifts to What Post-Cold War Arms 
Agenda Should Be 
by Jeffrey W. Knopf 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
July 1, 2002 
On May 24, 2002, at a summit meeting in Moscow, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty to reduce both sides' deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The 
two presidents also signed a joint declaration outlining a new strategic relationship involving increased 
cooperation between the two countries. The U.S. government refers to the new arms treaty as the Treaty 
of Moscow, while some commentators have adopted the acronym SORT, for strategic offensive 
reductions treaty. 
The treaty requires cutting deployed strategic warheads from approximately 6000 on each side today to 
between 1700 and 2200 by the end of 2012. It does not set any specific targets along the way; each side 
can reduce as fast or as slow as it wishes (or even temporarily increase its forces) as long it meets the 
deadline ten years from now. In contrast to earlier treaties, the agreement allows both sides complete 
freedom to choose the types and mix of delivery vehicles on which their permitted warheads will be 
deployed. The treaty expires at the end of 2012 unless the two sides agree to extend it. Either party can 
withdraw from the treaty before then by giving three months notice, half the withdrawal period specified in 
previous arms control pacts. 
President Bush had initially expressed reluctance to negotiate a formal treaty, preferring an informal, 
handshake agreement instead. However, he acceded to requests by the Russian government and a 
bipartisan group of U.S. Senators to put the agreement in treaty form. Russia wanted a formal accord so 
as to bind President Bush's successors to uphold any agreement. And Democratic and Republican 
Senators wrote the president to express their belief that nuclear arms control agreements are too 
important to bypass the Constitutional requirement to seek Senate ratification.  
In terms of what it does to reduce nuclear threats to national security, the treaty's accomplishments are 
fairly limited. In some ways the treaty represents only modest incremental change from earlier U.S.-
Russian agreements, and in some areas it even undoes measures that had previously been accepted. Its 
most important benefit may be indirect: it is part of a continuing process of improving the relationship 
between the former Cold War adversaries. As the two sides transition to a possible post-Cold War 
agenda for arms control, two items that are not dealt with by the Moscow Treaty are likely to become 
more important: tactical nuclear weapons and the security of nuclear materials. 
U.S. and Russian arsenals currently conform to limits set by the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction (START) 
Treaty; a second START treaty signed in 1993 was never ratified in the same form by both sides. 
Compared to the existing START-I limits, the Moscow Treaty will reduce deployed warheads by about 
two-thirds after ten years elapse. However, this does not go much beyond what has long been agreed to 
in principle. In 1997, then Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed that the next U.S.-Russia treaty 
should reduce strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 by 2007. Compared to this earlier agenda, 
the Moscow Treaty takes five more years to cut arsenals by only 300 additional warheads. However, 
Clinton and Yeltsin never finalized the treaty they envisioned; disagreements over Kosovo and Chechnya 
and domestic opposition to the proposed deal in each country's legislature made negotiations infeasible. 
What is significant about the Moscow Treaty, therefore, is not so much the numbers as the fact that Bush 
and Putin successfully closed the deal.  
For the United States, one major goal was to preserve maximum flexibility with respect to how nuclear 
weapons might figure in future U.S. defense plans. The Moscow Treaty thus conforms quite closely to 
recommendations outlined in the recent Nuclear Posture Review. While flexibility is desirable in the 
abstract, it can be a double-edged sword in practice. A country can leave options open for itself only by 
allowing other countries to have available the same openings. Sometimes, greater security can be 
obtained by giving something up in order to get others to give it up as well. From this perspective, four 
areas where the Moscow Treaty does not impose restrictions could become problematic in the future.  
First, the treaty undoes an earlier agreement to eliminate multiple-warhead missiles. START II specified 
that each side had to de-MIRV its missiles. The Moscow Treaty recognizes only START I as legally in 
force, however, effectively declaring START II null and void (subsequent to the Moscow summit, Russia 
also announced that, in response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it would no longer consider 
itself bound by START II). This means Russia can keep its existing multiple-warhead SS-18s and build 
new MIRVed missiles in the future if it chooses. If the United States or Russia maintains MIRVs, this will 
also make it harder to pressure China not to MIRV its missiles. During the Cold War, multiple-warhead 
missiles led to concerns about a possible "window of vulnerability," because they made it hypothetically 
conceivable that one side could use a portion of its force to take out all the land-based missiles on the 
other side (submarine-based forces remained invulnerable, however, which made it unlikely either side 
would really take the risk of launching a first strike against the other's land-based missiles). Should 
Russia or China utilize the option to build substantial MIRVed forces, this could again create fears about 
the potential vulnerability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This hypothetical concern is not realistic in the 
immediate future, however, because Russia is too financially strapped to initiate a major buildup and 
China still lags too far behind the United States. Any new dangers in this area would not emerge for many 
years, which leaves time to revisit this issue if necessary, provided that future leaders are willing to do so. 
Second, unlike all previous nuclear arms control pacts, the Moscow Treaty does not limit delivery vehicles, 
only warheads. Neither side is obligated to dismantle any of the missiles, bombers or submarines that 
could deliver strategic warheads. When the treaty expires, they could thus reload the warheads if they so 
choose and immediately reconstitute their forces to START-I levels. This is unlikely to threaten the United 
States directly, but it could complicate non-proliferation efforts. If other countries perceive this as a 
loophole that means the United States and Russia are not serious about reducing their nuclear arsenals, 
they will be less likely to be sympathetic to U.S. efforts to pressure other countries not to acquire nuclear 
weapons. On the other hand, saving these strategic systems from destruction could enable them to be 
used with conventional weapons, which could be valuable for limiting defense costs.  
Two other features of the Moscow Treaty are consistent with past nuclear arms treaties, but potentially 
more problematic in the post-9/11 world. A third potential problem is that the treaty covers only strategic 
warheads and not so-called tactical weapons, which are designed for delivery at much shorter ranges. 
The United States retains about 1000 operational tactical weapons plus more in reserve (although these 
are currently being dismantled), while Russia has an estimated 3500 operational tactical warheads and 
more than 10,000 in storage. 
Fourth, the treaty imposes no requirement to dismantle strategic warheads. It limits only deployed 
warheads. In removing warheads from deployment, each side is free to choose how many to destroy, 
how many to place in deep storage, and how many to leave easily available as operational spares. In 
practice, because of the difficulty and expense of dismantlement, Russia is unlikely to destroy very many 
of its warheads, while the United States has indicated that it intends to keep a large number of 
operational spares in case any problems develop with the reliability of deployed warheads. This has 
mixed implications: retaining spares may reduce pressures to resume production or testing of nuclear 
warheads, but also increases proliferation risks. 
Most important, the lack of restrictions on tactical warheads and absence of any commitment to dismantle 
strategic warheads may increase the risk of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon. Non-governmental 
experts believe Russia's ability to track and protect tactical weapons and non-deployed strategic 
warheads is not as great as its ability to guard the warheads that remain in missiles, bombers or 
submarines. Adding to the number of strategic and tactical warheads sitting in storage may thus create a 
greater chance of a nuclear device being smuggled out or stolen and ending up in the hands of terrorists. 
When it comes to keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists, an ounce of prevention is worth 
at least a pound of cure. If the desire to retain flexibility prevented including provisions that could reduce 
the risk of nuclear terrorism, this is not a prudent trade-off. 
The U.S. government certainly recognizes the danger here, and has sought to address it in other ways. 
The joint declaration signed at the Moscow summit calls for setting up joint working groups of experts to 
find additional ways to improve the security of all weapons of mass destruction. And a Group-of-Eight 
summit in Canada in late June pledged $20 billion over the next decade to assist Russia in destroying 
and safeguarding its nuclear, biological, and chemical stockpiles. 
Presidents Bush and Putin seem to have wanted a nuclear arms agreement primarily as a stepping-stone 
to other objectives with respect to U.S.-Russian relations. President Bush sought to reduce friction over 
nuclear arms issues so as to gain greater Russian cooperation in dealing with terrorism, Saddam Hussein, 
and the conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia. Improved relations could also ease the way for 
Russia and other former Soviet republics to become a more significant alternative source of oil for the 
West. For President Putin, acceding to U.S. wishes on the details of the nuclear arms treaty served a 
strategy of gaining greater integration with the West, including a more substantial role in NATO and 
perhaps eventual WTO membership. 
If the Moscow summit and its agreements have set the United States and Russia on a course of improved 
relations, then there may be opportunities in the future for follow-up talks on nuclear arms control. The 
risks associated with tactical weapons and with spare strategic warheads and their nuclear materials 
create an obvious agenda. If nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism become more clearly identified as 
leading threats, then the two sides may become more willing to irreversibly destroy more of their nuclear 
devices and to further improve the physical protection of the nuclear warheads and materials that remain 
in their possession. This will require a willingness to continue talking about nuclear arms control, however, 
rather than a view that the Moscow Treaty represents the final word. 
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